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FUTURE PROPERTY INTERESTS IN KENTUCKY.*
VI PowERs.
(a) Definition
A power over land, as defined by Tiffany, is a right or
ability in a person to create an estate or interest in the land,
or to impose a lien thereon, which, when exercised, takes effect
in diminution or to the destruction of the rights of others in
the land, or if it takes effect in diminution or to the destruction
of an estate belonging to the person exercising the power, does
so by reason of the power alone, without reference to his owner-
ship of the estate.1 As he further points out, such a power over
land is not an estate in the land. It is a mere ability to dispose
of it, and according to views set out in some cases, not even an
interest in the land.
This definition, however, includes not only powers of ap-
pointment but also the familiar powers of attorney as well. It
is with the former that we are chiefly concerned when dealing
with future interests. A power of appointment as defined by
the English court in Maundrell v. MaundreI 2 is a mode which
the owner of the estate reserves to himself, or gives to another,
through the medium of the statute of uses, of raising and pass-
ing an estate. And still later Jessel, M. R., gives us a definition
in simpler words in his opinion in the case of Freme v.
Glement,3 where he says it is a power of disposition given a per-
son over property not his own by someone who directs the mode
in which that power shall be exercised by a particular instru-
ment.
The person who creates the power of appointment is called
the donor and the person to whom the power is given, the donee.
On the exercise of the power the donee becomes the appointor
and the persons in whose behalf it is exercised are appointees.
In England owing to the frequency of family settlements
of land, cases bearing upon powers of appointment are very
numerous. In this country while such case cases do not come
*The first installments of this article are published in the January,
March and May issues of the Kentucky Law Journal. Vol. XIL
1 Real Property (2d Ed.) 1041.
' 10 Ves. Jr. 247.
3 18 Ch. D. 499, at 504.
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before the courts so often, they are far irom being exceptional,
and not a few cases dealing with powers of appointment are to
be found in our own state reports.
(b) Classifieation
With respect to the scope of the power of appointment,
powers are either general or special. The Court of Appeals
in Dudley v. Weinhart4 said: "Now, a general power of ap-
pointment is a power given by the maker of a deed or will, called
the donor of the power to another person, called the donee
of the power, in the name of and by the authority of the
donor, to create a new estate in any one out of the estate of
the donor without divesting any estate previously granted or
devised subject to such power; or by divesting an estate pre-
viously granted subject to such power and bestowing on another
person. Such power has always been exercised and held valid
as being the will of the donor of the power, and not as a revoca-
tion or destruction of his will in the sense of the statute supra;
for it is perfectly competent for a testator to give another per-
son the power to dispose of his property. according to his judg-
ment and discretion." The testator had provided in his will
that his wife might change or cancel certain gifts provided she
did so by an instrument in her own handwriting, attested by
two witnesses and recorded in the county court before the gift
or devise took effect, which was not to be until the thirteenth
day after the will was probated. The widow exercised the power
conferred upon her and it was contended that this was an at-
tempt to give her the power to revoke the will after the death of
the testator and not within the provision of the statute provid-
ing for the revocation of a will. The validity of such a power
of appointment was upheld.
A special or limited power is one which points out the group
or class to the members of which an appointment may be made
or limits the quantum of the estate to be appointed. Such was
the power involved in McCormick v. Security Trust Company of
Lexington.5 The testator bequeathed all his property to his
wife during her lifetime with the right to dispose of it by deed
4 93 Ky. 401, 20 S. W. 308.
' 184 Ky. 25.
KENTUcKY LAw Jou NAL
or will in such proportions as she might think best among their
children.
With respect to the estate of the donee, powers are simply
collateral or not simply collateral. As stated in Columbia Trust
Co. v. Christopher,6 "powers are either collateral or such as
relate to an estate or interest given by the donor to the donee of
the power. A collateral power is a bare power given to a mere
stranger, who has no interest in the estate or property to which
the power relates; e. g., a power of sale given to executors." A
power relating to an estate or interest may be either appendant
or gross. The court further explains that "a power is append-
ant when the estate created by the execution of the power over-
reaches, affects, or destroys the interest of the donee. It is gross
when the estate created by the execution of the power is beyond
and does not affect the estate or interest of such donee. Thus
a power of appointment by will given to a tenant for life is in
gross. The execution of such a power does not affect the life
estate of the donee of the power. A power of sale given a life
tenant is, however, appendant because the execution of such a
power overreaches, affects and destroys the interest of the
donee."
A further classification of powers is sometimes made with
respect to the discretion of the donee as to execution. They are
either powers in trust where the terms impose upon the donee
an imperative duty to execute the power, enforceable in equity;
or mere powers, where it is entirely within the discretion of
the donee as to whether he will exercise it or not.
(c) Who May Exercise a Power of Appointment
While it seems self-evident that only those who can dispose
.of property can create powers of appointment,7 it also seems
clear that one not having the necessary qualifications to convey
or to dispose of property may, nevertheless, exercise a power of
appointment. In the words of the court in Kennedy v. Ten
Broeck, "There can be no question that a feme covert can be
invested by deed or will emanating from a third party, with a
power of appointment in lands; still, as long as she is under the
C133 Ky. 335, 344, 345.
'Kennedy v. Ten Broeck, 11 Bush (Ky.) 241.
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disability of coverture there is no rule of law or equity enabl-
ing the wife, by her own deed or in conjunction with her hus-
band, to vest herself with such a power in or over her general
estate. A feme covert can only dispose of her lands in the man-
ner pointed out by the statute, nor can the consent of the hus-
band by uniting with her in the deed remove the disability or
confer upon the wife the power to dispose of her property in
any other way."s
The same result was reached in Ford's EB'rs v. Ford9 and
in Hankins v. Columbia Trust 0o.10 The latter decision arose
under the present statute affecting married women's property
rights. And it is evident that not only married women can
exercise a power of appointment but section 4826 of the statutes
makes it clear that a minor may also, although he is not allowed
to make a valid will for other purposes. Of course the reason
why one incapacitated from conveying property himself may
exercise a power of appoiontment is that it is the donor and not
the donee who is really passing title to the property under the
appointment.
(d) Release and Discharge of Powers
The question of whether powers of appointment may be re-
leased by the donee was carefully considered in Columbia Trust
Co. v. Christopher.:" It is there said that a power simply col-
lateral can not be extinguished or suspended by any act of the
donee. To use the words quoted by the court from the opinion
of the chancellor who tried the case in the lower court: "Such
a power is not in the nature of a right or interest in the donee
thereof, and is given, or supposed to have been given, for the
benefit of some third person. Thus, if a testator gives to his
wife power to dispose by will of any fixed portion of his estate
among certain named individuals or institutions, giving her at
the same time no interest in the, property so to be disposed of,
the wife would, in such case, have simply a collateral power.
She would have no interest whatever in the property, and could
uot by any act or agreement extinguish such power in herself
:11 Bush 251.
2 Duvall 418.142 Ky. 206, 134 S. W. 498.
U133 Ky. 335, 345, 350; 117 S. W. 943.
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or bind herself not to exercise it. Such power is indestructible
in its nature, and of course, every power coupled witlh a trust
or duty is likewise indestructible. The execution of such last
mentioned power is imperative on the donee, and it would be a
breach of trust for the donee to undertake not to execute the
power. All powers, however, other than powers collateral and
powers coupled with a trust or duty, may be suspended or de-
stroyed, either wholly or in part, by the donee thereof."12
This rule is undoubtedly true in regard to collateral powers
special, but it is suggested by Professor Gray that if the col-
lateral power be general as where the power can be exercised in
favor of the donee himself, if exercisable by deed or will, it can
be released.13 A release by the donee in such a case is, he says,
equivalent to an appointment by the donee.
By act of Parliament in England in 1882 it was provided
that even collateral powers might be extinguished or suspended
by act of the donee. In referring to that statutory change the
court in Columbia Trust Co. v. Christopher said: "In this State,
h4owever, I take it the rule is the same as it was in England
prior to January 1, 1882. As heretofore stated, the rule as it
then existed permitted the donee of the power, which related to
property an interest in which was given to the donee, to ex-
tinguish or suspend the power by express agreement or by im-
plication. All powers other than powers collateral and powers
coupled with a trust or duty, may be suspended or destroyed,
either in whole or in part, by the donee thereof."
The facts of the particular case under consideration by the
court were that the donor devised land to trustees to pay the in-
come to his mother for life, and on her death to convey to cer-
tain charities. The wife had a power, not testamentary, to ap-
point to another charity. The court held that the wife could
release the power.
In this case the court further states that any dealing with
the property inconsistent with the exercise of such power will
operate as an implied release or extinguishment of the power.
This statement it also based upon English decisions. In John-
son v. Yates14 the Court of Appeals had itself passed upon the
Partial revocation, MccampbeZZ v. McCampbeU, 198 Ky. 816.
124 Harvard L. Rev. 516.
14 9 Dana 491, 496.
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same question. A wife, having a life estate in property with a
general power of appointment by will or deed in writing, joined
with her husband and the trustee in a deed disposing of part of
the property absolutely. It was held that the power as far as
it related to the property thus disposed of was extinguished. /
Professor Gray, after reviewing the English cases holding
that testamentary powers may be released, referred to the decis-
ion in Columbia Trust Co. v. Christopher and the Rhode Island
case of Grosvenor v. Bowen and summarized his article on Re-
lease and Discharge of Powers by saying: "There are therefore
only two states, Kentucky and Rhode Island, in which the
English precedents have been followed (with perhaps the addi-
tion of Alabama), and it is submitted that the 'broad principles
of equity,' to use the expression of Kindersley, V. C., requires
that the doctrine should not be adpoted in other jurisdictions.' 1 5
(e) Appointments in Fraud of Power
Where a power of appointment is special, it is, as the court
pointed out in Degman v. Degman,16 a fraud for the donee of
the power to attempt to derive a personal benefit out of the exer-
cise of it for himself. In Degman v. Degman a widow, to whom.
a life estate was devised, with power to divide the remainder
among the testator's children as she should think best, under-
took to leave the greater portion to one of the sons on condition
that he should assume the payment of her debts and provide
for her and her second husband during their lives. The court
said: "It is likewise well settled that the power of appointment
must be exercised for the benefit of the parties entitled thereto,
and not with a view of benefiting the appointor or donee of the
power to appoint, and that an appointment or division made for
the purpose of benefiting the appointor is in law fraudulent
and void.' 17
'When we come to a general testamentary power there are
not the same grounds for objecting to the appointee's binding
himself to exercise the power in a particular way that there are
in the case of special powers. As the power is general the donee
24 Harvard L. R. 533.
1898 Ky. 717, 34 S. W. 523.
1198 Ky. 722.
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has a right to leave the property to any one he wishes and there
can be no violation of a fiduciary obligation if he covenants to
appoint to a certain person. The English cases further show
that the donee may make himself liable in damages for a breach
of such a covenant;' 8 and that if he does appoint in accordance
with such a covenant, the appointment will not be set aside.' 9
(f) Illusory Appointments
Closely akin to fraudulent appointments are illusory ap-
pointments. One is said to make an illusory appointment
where, having a power of appointing among all the members of
a class as to all of the children of A, he appoints a nominal
share only to one of the class. Under the doctrine of illusory
appointment courts have regarded such an exercise of the power
as invalid and have required that a substantial share be given
to each member of the class. The doctrine applies when the
power is nonexelusive, not when it is exclusive.
The question of whether a power is exclusive or nonex-
elusive was carefully considered in Barret's Ex'r v. Barret.
20
In that case the testator devised the bulk og his property to
a trustee, directing that it be divided into five equal parts,
one part to be held in trust for each of his five children and
at the death of each of his sons, his share was to pass as he
by will should direct, "to his wife and heirs at law, and in the
absence of a will, to his widow, if he leaves one, and to his heirs
at law in the same proportion as if he had died owning the same
in fee simple, according exactly to the law of descent and dis-
tribution as it then be in force in the State of Kentucky." One
son died in 1910 leaving a widow but no children. Prior to
his death another brother had died and had left one-half his
share to his widow and one-half to the brothers and sister. The
son, who died in 1910, by will appointed to his sister and to each
of his two surviving brothers $1,000 each. The remaining $147-
000 he devised in trust to the use of his wife with power to dis-
pose of it by will. She died in 1913 having by will appointed
the estate to her own relatives. An action was brought on the
IsIn re Parkin, L. R. (1892), 3 Ch. 510.
"Beyfus v. Lawley, L. R. App. Cases 411 (1903).
166 Ky. 411, 179 S. W. 396.
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ground that the appointment of $1,000 each to the sister and
brothers, and $147,000 to the widow was not a valid exercise of
the power given by the original donor. The court sustained
this contention, citing the earlier Kentucky cases on illusory
appointments.21 After mentioning the fact that in England
the doctrine was so much criticised by the leading jurists that
it was abrogated by statutes, the court expressed its own ap-
proval in the following paragraph:
"It has been said that the doctrine is founded upon no
principle, and that it is an arbitrary one, subject to no restraint
or limitation. But in this we do not concur, for it is grounded
upon the principle that, where a testator and donor of a power
of appointment has confided to the donee thereof a nonexclusive
power to dispose of the estate to the members of a designated
class, the donee must fairly and reasonably execute the power
and justify the confidence reposed in him, and that equity will
nullify any attempt to betray the trust thus created. Nor is
the doctrine an arbitrary one, subject to no restraint or limita-
tion; for, if the appointments made in execution of the power
are fairly and reasonably proportioned to the estate so distri-
buted, there is a valid execution of the power, notwithstanding
that the members of the designated class are not made equal in
the distribution. If such a rule is arbitrary, then most, if not
all, of the rules in equity possess the same attribute."
In holding that the doctrine is law in Kentucky the court
said: "If an analysis of these cases (McGaughey's Adm'r v.
Henry, Degman v. Degman, and Clay v. Smallwood) leaves any
doubt, however, that the illusory appointment doctrine is the
law of this state, we have no hesitation now in adopting it as a
competent rule in the testing of the execution of nonexclusive
powers."
In pointing out when a power is exclusive and when not,
the court said: "Powers of appointment to a class are 'exclu-
sive' or 'nonexclusive '-exclusive' when there is granted to the
donee of the power the right to exclude entirely any members
of the designated class; and 'nonexclusive' when no such right
2 McGaughey's Admr. v. Henry, 15 B. Mon. 383; Degman. v. Degman,
98 Ky. 717; Clay v. Smallwood , 100 Ky. 212, 38 S. W. 7; Levi v. Fidelity
Trust d 0. Co., 121 Ky. 82, 88 S. W. 1083
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of selection or exclusion is granted. In the case of 'nonexclu-
sive' powers, the exclusion of any member of the designated class
in making the appointments will invalidate the attempted exer-
cise of the power."
Levi v. Fidelity Trust and Safety Vault Co. 22 is an illustra-
tion of an exclusive power. The testator's widow was given the
power to "will or distribute to her relations and to my relations
any property, real or personal, as she may choose or desire them
to have." There was added the statement, "I am satisfied that
she will act justly in this matter." This power the court said
was a mere naked power, to be exercised at the discretion of the
donee.
As pointed out by the court in Barret's Ex'r v. Barret, the
doctrine has been abolished in England by statutes. In this
country some courts have repudiated it without the aid of legis-
lation 23 and Professor Gray in the article already referred to
speaks of it in these words: "But the rule as to illusory appoint-
ments is unique in the law. Other rules of doubtful character
have found defenders or apologists, but no one has had a good
word for this. It has been condemned in the most unmeasured
terms by judge after judge-by Sir Richard Pepper Arden
(afterwards Lord Alvonley, M. R.), in Spencer v. Spencer, 5
Ves. 362 (1800), and Kemp v. Kemp, Id.' 849 (1801); by Sir
William Grant, M. R., in Butcher v. Butcher, 9 Yes. 382 (1804) ;
and by Lord Eldon, C., in Box v. Whitbread, 16 Ves. 15 (1809),
and Butcher v. Butcher, 1 Ves. & B. 79, 94, 96 (1812)."24
There can be, however, no doubt as to the fact that the doc-
trine is law in this jurisdiction. To quote from a recent case.
McCormick v. Security Trust Co. of Lexington, 25 "The rule is
thoroughly established in this state that when a power of ap-
pointment is given by will to be exercised as to a class of per-
sons each one of the class is entitled to a substantial portion of
the estate, but it is not necessary that each of the class shall
receive an equal share."
121 Ky 82, 88 S. W. 1083.
=Graeff and Wife v. De Turk, 44 Pa. 527; Hawthorn v. Ulrio, 207
Ill. 430, 69 N. E. 885.
2425 H. L. R. 26.
-184 Ky. 25.
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(g) When Powers Survive
Under the old common law rule where a power was given
to several persons, it could not be exercised by less than all of
them.26  If one died, the power did not survive. As Professor
Kales pointed out, this rule has been curtailed in three ways:
"First, by statutes relating to the survival of powers in exe-
cutors; second, where the power was actually lost equity under
certain circumstances made those taking in default of appoint-
ment constructive trustees for those interested in the exercise
of the power; and third, courts have strained to construe the
power as exerciseable by whoever occupied the office of executor
or trustee where the power was conferred upon persons dis-
charging such office.
27
Section 2348 of the Kentucky Statutes provides for parti-
tion in the case of joint tenancies and abolishes the right of
survivorship in the case of such estates. Section 2349 reads:
"The preceding section shall not apply to any estate which joint
tenants have as executors or trustees, nor to an estate conveyed
or devised to persons in their own right, when it manifestly ap-
pears, from the tenor of the instrument, that it was intended
that the part of the one dying should belong to the others,
neither shall it affect the mode of proceeding on any joint con-
tract or judgment."
In section 3845 we find the provision that "when the powers
of one executor or administrator ceases, the remainder may
execute the trust, or, if none, administration de bonis non may
be granted, and, if there be a will with it annexed." And in
section 3846, which provides for the removal of a personal re-
presentative under certain conditions, in the case of a removal
it is further provided that "the other representative shall dis-
charge the trust."
When we come to the court decisions in regard to survival
of powers we find a distinction drawn between a naked power
and a power coupled with an interest. To quote from the court
in Atzinger v. Berger,25 "The authorities are agreed that, if,
2*Atwaters v. Birt, 2 Cro. Eliz. 856 (1603).
=Estates, Future Interests (2d Ed.), p. 713.
2,151 Ky. 802, 152 S. W. 971.
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when fairly construed, the language used by the testator may be
said to create a naked power, that is, a simple personal confi-
dence reposed in the trustees by the testator, then, in order to
pass title, it was necessary for both to qualify and convey; and
the failure of one so to do necessarily had the effect of invali-
dating the conveyance. If, on the other hand, the effect of the
language was to create a power, coupled with an interest, then
the trustee who did qualify and, in pursuance of the authority
granted, made the sale and conveyance, passed a perfect title."
The court cited with approval the earlier cases to the sane ef-
fect, Woolridge's Heirs v. Watkins, 3 Bibb, 349; Coleman v.
McKinney, 3 J. J. Marshall, 246; Muldrow's Heirs v. Fox's
Heirs, 2 Dana, 74; and Clay & Craig v. Hart, 7 Dana, 1.
A recent case to the effect that a naked power must be exer-
cised by all but that a power coupled with an interest may be
exercised by the survivor, is Steele v. Cassell.29 There a deed
conveyed land to husband, wife and children and gave the hus-
band and wife power to sell the same. It was held that the
husband's death did not defeat the power but that the wife
might exercise it in the interest of herself and her children. In
Owsley v. Bad's Trustee3 ° power to sell real estate and to re-
invest the proceeds was conferred by will upon a trustee. It
was held that this power was not exhausted by one sale and re-
investment. And in Bakewell v. Ogden3l the executors were
empowered by the will to sell the realty within two years. They
undertook to exercise the power ten years later. The court in
holding they had no right to do so, intimated that they would
have no authority to sell the lot at any time after the two years
from the testator's death.
(h) Gifts Implied in Default of Appointment
In the case of a power of appointment among a certain class
and the donee of the power dies without having made the ap-
pointment, the question arises as to what disposition shall be
made of the property where the donor made no provision in
case of default of appointment. A devises to B for life with
- 173 Ky. 317, 191 S. W. 640.
322 Ky. L. R. 355, 57 S. W. 225.
n2 Bush 265.
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power to appoint among the children of C, and B dies without
having appointed. Is this power given B to be regarded as one
in trust for all the children of C or can it be regarded as an
implied gift to them? Both theories have been advanced to
sustain the gift where there is no provision made in default of
appointment. The former, namely, raising a constructive trust
in favor of all the members of the class is equitable; and the
latter, the implied gift, is legal and is reached through construc-
tion of the language used in the will.
The Court of Appeals in McGaughey's Adm'r v. Henry3
2
adopted the theory of an implied gift. There a testator devised
part of his property as follows: "I will now designate the por-
tions or tracts of land allotted and bequeathed to my beloved
wife, Julia P." (describing two tracts), "set apart for the ex-
clusive benefit of my wife, to be disposed of in any way she
may think proper, as life interest, and at her death, or before,
to give said lands to any one or more of her children, as she may
believe them most worthy or needy." The wife died shortly
after the testator without having exercised the power. The
court held that her interest was a life estate and that the effect
of the language used was to create a gift to the children as a
class, subject to the wife's power of selection and discrimina-
tion, and that the power having failed, the gift to the children
as a class still remained.
The court in referring to 2 Jarman on Wills, side p. 485,
laid down the doctrine, "that where the property is given to
one for life, and afterward to such children, relations, etc., as
he or she shall appoint, or among them in such proportions as
the donee shall appoint, and there is no express gift to these
objects in default of appointment, such a gift will be implied:
the presumption being that the donor did not intend that the
objects of the power should be disappointed by the failure of the
donee to exercise it in their favor."
As pointed out by Professor Kales in his work on Future
Interests33 the doctrine of implication arose at a time when the
courts were very favorably disposed toward finding gifts by im-
plication in wills but that in the latter half of the 19th century
they ceased to look upon them with favor and that unless the
"15 B. Mon. 383 (1854).
212d Ed., section 637.
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doctrine under discussion has been firmly settled in a particular
case it is in a precarious position today. The English case of
In re Week's Settlement3 4 bears out his contention. Professor
Gray, who strongly supported the doctrine of gift by implica-
tion, has said: "The American cases lend no countenance to the
novel doctrine of In re Week's Settlement.' '3
In that case land was settled to the use of the wife for life,
and on her death, as she should by will appoint, and in default
of appointment,. to B. Also by another settlement personal
property was given in favor of the husband and wife for their
lives, and on the death of the survivor, as the survivor should
by deed or will appoint, and in default of appointment, to the
children of the marriage. The wife by her will gave her in-
terest in the land to her husband and also gave him power to
dispose of both the land and personalty by will among their
children. The husband died without appointing. The ques-
tion presented to the court was. whether B or the children took
the land. It was held that B was entitled to it. Romer, Jr.
in giving the opinion, said:
"The authorities do not show, in my opinion, that there is
a hard and fast rule that a gift to A for life with a power to A
to appoint among a class and nothing more must, if there is no
gift over in the will, be held a gift by implication to the class in
default of the power being exercised. In my opinion the cases
show (though there may be found here and there certain re-
marks of a few learned judges which, if not interpreted by the
facts of the particular case before .them, might seem to have a
more extended operation) that you must find in the will an indi-
cation that the testatrix did intend the class or some of the class
to take-intended in fact that the power should be regarded in
the nature of a trust-only a power of selection being, or,
for example, a gift to A for life with a gift over to such of a
class as A shall appoint.'"3
Since the Kentucky Court of Appeals in adopting the doc-
trine of gift by implication relied upon the English cases, if a
case were t6 come before it today involving the question pre-
sented in the case of In re Weekes' Settlement, is it not possible
-L. R. (1897), 1 Ch. 289.
,5 25 H. L. R. 18.
3- (1897) L. R. 1, Ch. 292.
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that it might following this later English precedent, Professor
Gray's objection to the contrary, notwithstanding?
(i) Appointed Property as Assets
As a general proposition when a general testamentary
power of appointment is exercised by the donee in favor of one
who pays no consideration, a "volunteer," the property becomes
assets for the payment of the donee's debts and claims of his
creditors will take precedence of the claims of the appointees.
37
This doctrine is well stated by Knight Bruce, L. J., in Fleming
v. Buchanan:
"On whatever grounds it was originally so held, it is and
has for a long time been the settled law of the country, that if
a man having a power, and a power only, over personal estate
to appoint it as he will, exercises the power by a testamentary
appointment, the property becomes subject in a certain order
and manner to the payment of his debts, whatever may be the
intention or absence of intention upon his part. Not only in
point of principle and reason, but of precedent and authority,
I apprehend that the same rule applies to real estate where it is
subject to a general power exercised by will. "38
This rule is said to have arisen out of consideration for
creditors and is a rule of equity, and Lord Hardwicke said that
equity intercepts the fund or stops it in transitu.3 9
The Court of Appeals in Boyce v. Waller40 after stating
the rule as laid down in the English decisions, said: "And this
judicial doctrine has been virtually recognized by the Legisla-
ture of this State, in that provision in the statute against fraudu-
lent devises, which makes every voluntary execution of a general
power of appointment by will, fraudulent as to the creditors of
the donee of the power, unless they or some of them be the ap-
pointees. "
(j) Defective Execution
In cases where it was provided in the instrument creating
the power that the power should be executed in a certain way
311 Tiffany Real Property (2d Ed.) 1107.
23 D. & G. 976, 980.
' Lord Townshend v. Windlham, 2 Yes. Sen. 1, 11.
'* 9 Dana 478, 481.
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and the donee attempted to appoint in a different manner than
that specified, equity early came to the aid of the appointees who
were (1) purchasers for value, (2) creditors, (3) persons for
whom the donee was, by relationship, bound to make provision,
and (4) charities; and compelled the person or persons entitled
in default of execution to make good the defect.
Section 4829 of our statutes bears upon this point and pro-
vides: "No appointment made by will in exercise of any power
shall be valid unless the same is so executed that it would be
valid for the disposition of the property to which the power ap-
plies if it belonged to the testator; and every will so executed,
except the will of a married woman, shall be a valid execution
of a power of appointment by will, notwithstanding the instru-
ment creating the power expressly requires that a will made in
execution of suchk power shall be executed with some additional
or other form of execution or solemnity."
The general principle that equity will aid a defective exe-
cution of a power when a proper case for such aid arises was
approved by the Court of Appeals in Mddrow's Heirs v. Fox's
Heirs4 ' in the following language: "Although a chancellor can
not enforce the execution of a mere power, 2 Pr. Wins. 227,
nevertheless, there can be no doubt that he may, on the applica-
tion of a beneficial party, enforce the execution or supply the
defective execution, of a power connected with a trust, or which
it is the duty of the depository to execute. 4 Kent's Commen-
taries, 344; .2 Roper on Legacies, 300. Whenever the power
fails in consequence of the death or accidental incapacity of its
appointed depository, or whenever it is in danger of being frus-
trated or injuriously exercised the chancellor may interpose,
and in a proper ease, between the proper parties, his decree will
be effected."
(k) What Words Exercise a Power
Closely allied to the subject of defective execution is the
question, What words will be taken as an exercise of a power?
As stated by Tiffany,42 "it is well settled that the instrument
executing the power need not specifically refer to the power,
412 Dana 74, 82.
421 Real Property (2d Ed.), 1081.
PROPERTY INTERESTS IN KENTUCKY
provided it shows an intent to execute it ........ It has oc-
casionally been said that the intent to execute a power must
appear in one of three ways--either (1) by' reference to the
power; (2) by reference to the property which is the subject of
the power; or (3) by reason of the fact that the instrument will
be ineffectual unless considered as an execution of the power.
It has, on the other hand frequently been considered that the
intent need not appear in one of these ways, but that it is to be
ascertained, as in any other case, by a construction of the whole
instrument, with reference to the circumstances under which
it was executed."
This question so far as testamentary powers are concerned
is governed by section 4845 of the Kentucky Statutes, which
provides that "a devise or bequest shall extend to any real or
personal estate over which the testator has a discretionary power
of appointment, and to which it would apply if the estate was
his own property; and shall operate as an execution of such
power, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will."
This statute is not limited to general powers as is shown by
the language of the court in Herbert's Guardian v. Herbert's
Ez'rs.4 3 There the court said: "This provision of the statute
evidently means that when the power of appointment is given
to be exercised by a last will, that a devise of the testator's whole
estate to the person who, in the testator's discretion, he has a
right to designate, the person thus designated will take under
the devise, and the same shall be regarded as the execution of
the power, although the power given may not be mentioned or
referred to."
As pointed out in McCormick v. Security Trust Co. of Lex-
ington 4" this statute applies to testamentary appointments only
and we are left in the ease of appointments by deed to the com-
mon law rule for guidance. In that case one E had a special
power of appointment over certain land, exercisable by deed or
will among her children. She had a life estate in the land, but
besides the power, no other interest. She conveyed by deed
part of the land to her son T in fee, reserving a fife estate to
herself but making no reference to the power. By will she de-
vised all her property to her four children, including T, in
85 Ky. 134, 147.
184 Ky. 25, 28.
L. .- 4
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equal shares, but again she failed to mention the power. The
court held that the power was exercised by both instruments.
(1) Execution in Excess of Power
When the donee of a power makes an appointment in excess
of th6 power granted as a general rule courts will allow the part
coming within the power granted to take effect and will hold the
part in excess of the power void.45 This principle was recog-
nized and followed in Johnson v. Yates. 6
(in) Powers in Life Tenant to Dispose of the Fee
One point further remains to be considered in dealing with
the subject under consideration, that is to determine whether a
power is given to a life tenant to dispose of the fee. or not. Where
a power of disposing of the land is given a life tenant some
courts have regarded this power as allowing the life tenant to
dispose of his life estate only, while other courts have taken the
position that such a power gives the life tenant the right to dis.
pose of the fee. It is claimed by those that take the first view
that the remainderman's estate ought not to be sacrificed unless
the language of the testator clearly indicates that the power to
convey a fee is granted the life tenant. Courts taking the oppo-
site view saw it would be superfluous to grant to the life tenant
power to dispose of his life estate and therefore the testator
must intend to give him power to dispose of the fee.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has taken the latter view.
In McCullough's Adm'r v. Anderson47 the testator devised his
estate to his wife in the following words: "To my most precious
and well beloved wife I give, during her life, all my estate, real
and personal, whether in possession or in action, with full and
ample authority to dispose of the whole of it as she pleases. At
her death, should she not have previously made a testamentary
distribution of all remaining undisposed of by her, I desire that
such remainder shall be distributed as herein directed. The
court held that this did not create a fee in the wife but a life
estate only, with power to dispose of it and what remained at
$284 Ill. 11.
40 9 Dana 491, 497.
4 90 Ky. 126, 13 S. W. 353.
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her death went to the testator's devisees, and not to the heirs
of the wife.
In Coats' Ex'r v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Com-
pany4 there was a similar provision in a will. The testator de-
vised all his estate to his wife "to be at her absolute disposal to
sell, convey, transfer or expend as she may deem proper during
her lifetime without restraint, she to receive all rents, dividends
or interest on investments, or to convert the same into money
or other investments at her discretion, and after her death the
remainder of my estate unexpected by her I devise and bequeath
as follows." It was held that one who purchased shares of
stock sold by the duly authorized agent of the widow took a
good title. The same result was reached in Lee v. Fidelity Trust
& Safety Vault Co.49 The court quoted with approval the rule
laid down in McCullough's Adm'r v. Anderson, namely: "After
a careful review of all the authorities to which our attention has
been called, the rule sanctioned and followed is this: If the estate
is given or devised generally or indefinitely, with a power of dis-
position, it passes a fee, but when the devisor or grantor owning
the fee gives to the first taker an estate for life, with the power
to dispose of the fee, no greater estate is vested in the first taker
than that carved out of the fee, and vested in him by the devisor
or grantor. He is given a life estate in express terms, and the
failure to exercise the power gives to the remainderman the
fee, because, no disposition having been made of it by the life
tenant, he takes under the will or conveyance." .....
"The rule thus announced is in harmony with the statute long
in force in this state (see Ky. St. section 2345)."
Of similar purport are Pedigo's Ex'x v. Botts,50 Mandel v.
Fidelity Trust Co.,5 1 McCormick v. McCormick,52 and Trustees
Presbyterian Church, Somerset v. Mize.5 3
After a survey of the Kentucky decisions dealing with
questions relating to powers, one can not fail to note the fact
that the court has relied to a great extent upon the English cases
92 Ky. 263, 17 S. W. 564.
"22 Ky. L. R. 311, 57 S. W. 239.
- 28 Ky. L. R. 196, 89 S. W. 164.
132 Ky. Ii. R. 1085, 107 S. W. 775
2121 S W. 450.
181 Ky. 567, 205 S. W. 674.
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in settling points as they have come before it for the first time
and has generally followed the rules laid down by the English
courts.
W. LEwis ROBERTS,
Uiiversity of Kentucky, College of Law.
(To be continued)
